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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter argues that whereas perceptual experience is underconstant in one
sense, it is virtually constant insofar as it is functionally stable and predictable.
The possibility of distinguishing perception and cognition is explored in
experiments on the perception of surface orientation. These experiments are
related to the study of self-motion perception and space perception. An
experiment comparing monocular and binocular perception of hills revealed
perceptual differences, between-subjects, that were masked in within-subject
comparisons by metacognitive strategies. A second experiment found that
participants wearing heavy backpacks gave (cognitively) elevated slope
estimates only because of experimental demands not physical ones. Perceptual
experience is informative about perceptual processing, but reports of experience
are subject to cognitive contamination. True perceptual experience may be
virtually constant insofar as the perceptual consequences of actions can be
correctly anticipated.
Keywords: perceptual experience, cognition, monocular perception, binocular perception,
metacognition, cognitive contamination

When humans walk through a fixed environment they experience that
environment as stationary and stable. Yet at the same time they may be aware of
the optic flow of the objects and walls around them. This awareness of motion
superimposed on a stable world might be compared to the awareness of
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shadows or other gradients of light cast upon a surface that nonetheless appears
uniform in color: We know that we are the source of the motion, just as we know
that illumination changes are the sources of shadows. But awareness of optic
flow might alternatively be compared to the awareness of converging lines in a
hallway whose walls nonetheless appear parallel. We do know that the perceived
optic flow rate during self-motion is much reduced compared to how the same
relative flow rate would be experienced when standing still (Durgin et al. 2005).
That is, “retinal” properties of flow are lost during self-motion (like “retinal” size
and color are unrecoverable). Thus, our perceptual experience seems to include
only the shadows of underconstancy, which may often be corrected for in
judgment by metacognitive awareness (Granrud 2009).
A primary thesis of this chapter is that this state of affairs (systematic
underconstancy) may be no accident if our perceptual experience needs to
retain the structured correlations among perceptual and motor variables that
can most effectively control and guide our actions. Whereas Noë (2004) suggests
that perceptions of constancies, like surface color, emerge, Gibson-like, from the
external predictability of the non-constant image transformations, he seems to
assume that we have access to the undistorted retinal array. An alternative view
is that we have partial constancy in our immediate perceptual experience and
that virtual constancy and stability can be achieved insofar as the perceptual
predictions we can make about the consequences of our actions are accurate.
That is, virtual perceptual constancy is achieved insofar as we can predict how
our (non-constant) perceptions will be modified as we move our bodies (e.g.,
down a hallway) or even as we move our attention.
Full perceptual constancy, on this account (e.g., not being able to see optic flow
at all) might be disastrous. For example, when we move, objects that we pass
rotate with respect to our reference frame, but Wallach et al. (1974) showed that
during self-motion there is a huge drop in sensitivity to correlated object
rotations (relative to an absolute reference (p.88) frame). This is probably
because precise predictions of object shear for stationary objects in the
environment during self-motion would require a full and accurate coding of
spatial layout, so it is probably more efficient to accept nearly whatever shear
emerges during self-motion as consistent with a stable environment
(discrimination is sacrificed for stability).
In contrast, Durgin and Gigone (2007) have shown that sensitivity to optic flow
rates for highly predictable surfaces like the ground plane is enhanced during
self-motion (for speeds in the range appropriate to walking, for example),
consistent with the idea that predictability is fundamental: Retinal flow is
distorted (consistent with partial constancy in the form of world stability), but
the distortion produces a gain in sensitivity to information relevant to the
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prediction of perceptual consequences of self-motion (Durgin 2009; see also
Abrams et al. 2007). Partial constancy may thus provide a useful compromise.
A secondary thesis of this paper, however, is that perceptual experience, tainted
and distorted as it may be, has a kind of stability and reliability that can seem to
be falsified by incautious methods of measurement. Whereas the boundary
between perception and judgment is never easy to define, there are contexts in
which it is possible to distinguish between judgmental biases and perceptual
ones. Finding ways to make these distinctions with greater certainty may not be
easy but is important. Although the study of perceptual processing cannot be
conducted reliably by introspection alone, neither should it be conducted as if
introspection were impossible. The studies of perceived optic flow rate discussed
above depended on several different forms of measurement including,
importantly, magnitude estimation, which is a form of momentary introspection.
But any particular measurement technique can introduce biases and confusions.
For example, successive comparison of two stimuli may appear to be a fairly safe
perceptual task, but judgments relative to an internal standard have been shown
to be much more precise than perceptual comparisons of successively presented
stimuli (Nachmias 2006). Even successive comparison involves memory and
therefore the possibility of judgmental bias.
Here we consider some problems in the empirical conceptualization of
perceptual experience using the perception of empty spatial extents and two
studies of surface orientation as sample cases. We start with the idea that
perceptual experience is not to be confused with perceptual information and
then develop the idea that neither is it to be confused with perceptual
judgments. We will return at the end to the possible relation between perceptual
underconstancies and the kind of virtual perceptual constancy that successful
perceptual prediction affords.

One depth doesn’t fit all
One preliminary point is that different sources of perceptual information may
lead to different kinds of perceptual experience and that constancy of the sort
we are discussing may fail when certain specific forms of information are absent.
Some theories of cue combination suggest that when visual sources of
information about depth can be integrated, they will be (e.g., Hillis et al. 2002),
whereas cross-modal sensory experiences are (p.89) not necessarily fused.
Hillis et al. considered the fusion of stereoscopic information about surface slant
with texture information about surface slant and contrasted it with haptic
information about surface slant. There are, of course, cross-modal confusions.
For example, many individuals report feeling the warmth of a bright laser
pointer light shone on “their” hand (even though they are only viewing a light
shown on a rubber hand that, by means of mirrors, appears in the location of
their hand; Durgin et al. 2007a). In speech, most individuals report hearing “da”
when seeing video of clearly separated lips pronouncing the syllable “ga” in
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synchrony with a sound that normally sounds like “ba” (McGurk and MacDonald
1976). If one assumes that perception is an attribution based on available
evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that depth information provided by one
rich (metric) source of visual information can be substituted for that produced
by another. However, there appear to be strange incompatibilities between
different sources of information about relative distance from the observer.
Indeed, some of these incompatibilities lie within a given system.
For example, Mamassian (2008) has found that perceiving that a surface is
slanted using binocular disparity is ten times harder (less sensitive) than
perceiving a difference in depth between two surfaces—even though the
stimulus information specifying the presence of slant and the difference in depth
was identical in his stimuli. Perceived slant is simply a different feature than
distance, which receives different information from disparity maps.
Whereas textbooks commonly suggest that motion parallax is a rich source of
metric depth information (e.g., Wolfe et al. 2006), and there are even arguments
that it is preferable on computational grounds (e.g., Richards 1985), the case of
Stereo Sue (Sacks 2006) provides a hint that this is not reflected in perceptual
experience. Susan Barry was born strabismic (cross-eyed) so that her eyes did
not focus on the same place. Her vision in each eye was perfectly adequate, and
her visual experience for most of her life alternated between her two eye views,
with each eye image sometimes being the suppressed one. Because she never
used her eyes in concert, she was stereoblind until in middle age she undertook
vergence exercises that allowed her (eventually) to stop suppressing and use her
two (now verged) eye images in conjunction with one another. Her case is
already highly controversial, because of the widespread belief that unused
stereo channels atrophy completely. Moreover, her subjective reports concerning
the experiential difference between her new binocular perceptions and her
former experience of the world has only increased the level of skepticism about
her claims. This is because she suggested that, prior to gaining binocular vision,
she had never experienced “depth,” by which she may mean the empty space
between things. For most current theorists, this notion seems confused. Depth is
depth, they argue, by whatever source. Such theorists accept that different
sources of depth information may be more precise than others, but assume that
all provide perceptual “depth.”
One specific example Sue gives is of seeing for the first time that trees contain a
tangible volume of space (as opposed to merely a layered tangle of branches).
The tree example seems telling because it is exactly the example used by Wolfe
et al.’s (2006) excellent (p.90) textbook when describing the richness of depth
provided by motion parallax. Their textbook suggests that the student lie under
a tree:
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Gaze up in the branches and leaves with one eye covered and your head
stationary. You will notice that the leaves and branches form a relatively
flat texture. You can see all the details, but you may have trouble deciding
if one little branch lies in front of or behind another. If you open the other
eye, stereopsis…will allow the branches and leaves to fill out a threedimensional volume that was lacking before. Close the eye and the volume
collapses. Now, move your head from side to side and motion parallax will
restore the sense of depth.
(Wolfe et al. 2006, 137)
Although Wolfe et al. (2006) intend to portray motion parallax as equivalent to
stereopsis, the choice of words here creates an appropriate contrast between
them insofar as “the sense of depth” one gets from motion parallax sounds
entirely inferior to the “three-dimensional volume” provided by stereopsis.
LeClair and Durgin (2008) compared metric depth interval estimation from
motion parallax with that from binocular stereopsis. We suspended pairs of
objects (“clouds” of polyester batting) at different locations within a well-lit, but
featureless chamber 4 m deep and asked observers to estimate the true
distances between the paired objects in one of three conditions:
Monocularly, with lateral head movements of twice the typical
interpupillary distance (motion parallax);
Binocularly, without head movements (binocular stereopsis); or
Monocularly, without head movements (control).
The difference in subjective impressions for motion parallax and binocular
conditions, consistent with the retrospective claims of Susan Barry, were
reflected by depth interval estimates which were much less variable and much
more accurate under static binocular viewing than with motion parallax. Indeed,
although motion parallax reduced response variability relative to the control
condition, the average estimates in the two monocular conditions were quite
similar and were much less than the depth estimates given under binocular
viewing. Our own subjective impression was that as we moved our head with
only one eye open we saw the two objects slide back and forth with respect to
each other, but we (like our naïve participants, apparently) experienced no sense
of depth between them, only the sure knowledge that larger relative motions
signaled larger separations in depth.
Our observation is not without precedent. Ono et al. (1986) noted that only in
very near space of 30–80 cm do simulated motion parallax displays appear rigid
(see also Nawrot 2003). But the more widely held view is the one presented in
the textbook, that motion parallax provides all the information you need to get
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metric depth. We do not deny that some motion parallax displays are incredibly
compelling (especially those involving very near space), but we suspect that for
normal large scale scenes, motion parallax can often seem impressively effective
at capturing spatial layout primarily because the motion parallax gradient can
be anchored to the ground plane—which has its own distance metric built into it
(Beusmans 1998; Gibson 1950).
(p.91) So does this support Stereo Sue’s assertion that depth from binocular
disparity is qualitatively different than depth from other sources? Perhaps, but
not convincingly. It remains reasonable, as in the cases examined by Mamassian
(2008), to consider that the computations carried out on various kinds of
theoretically useful information may lead to surprisingly divergent
consequences. The fact that performance at our cloud task was so poor with
motion parallax relative to performance with binocular stereopsis encourages
the view (consistent with Mamassian’s observation) that binocular information is
particularly good at representing the volumetric separations between surfaces
whereas motion parallax is not particularly good at this—at a viewing distance
exceeding a meter. But the striking failure of binocular slant perception in
Mamassian’s special case is worth keeping in mind. It may be that even though
spatial layout was evident to Susan Barry before she became Stereo Sue, there
really was no perception of empty space. It was Gibson who suggested that there
was no such thing as space perception—only the perception of surfaces. But the
cloud study points to empty-space perception as an experiential reality that
binocular vision may uniquely support but that is frequently supplemented by
metacognition.
It remains possible that the vergence system itself plays an important role in
this, but the main point is that the specific kind of volumetric experience that
Wolfe et al. (2006) describe for the binocular view of trees (which goes beyond
what vergence could possibly achieve) really may be something that can only be
activated by binocular inputs or by other inputs (e.g., motion parallax in very
near space) that have become appropriately linked to binocular inputs through
experience. Sometimes different sources of information about surface layout
may be overlaid rather than fused. We just don’t know enough yet to be sure.
What we do know is that perceptual experience is not the same as perceptual
information, and yet perceptual experience may have a lot to tell us about how
perceptual information is processed. However, getting access to perceptual
experience for objective measurement is not easy.

Experiment 1: When big effects have small consequences
One sub-goal in the experimental study of perceptual experience is for the
experimenter to convince research participants simply to report their experience
honestly. This should help make modeling perceptual experience possible. Some
of us develop complicated instruction sets designed to encourage participants to
appreciate that their reports are our only access to their subjective experiences
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and emphasizing that it is those experiences that we want to measure. But there
are times (unlike the cloud case above) when the perceptual reports that we
collect are in striking variance with our own subjective impressions of how the
stimulus appears. These moments can be quite frustrating, indeed—and all the
more so because our participants are sometimes a little too clear that, despite
their original promises to report things as they saw them, they could not
overcome the desire to be right, the wish not to appear foolish. Granrud’s (2009)
documentation of meta-perceptual awareness in children engaged in size
estimation tasks is a striking example of how dual awareness is one of the facts
of perceptual reports.
(p.92) One of the fundamental principles of slope perception is known as the
frontal tendency (Gibson 1950)—the tendency of surfaces to appear steeper than
they are. Bridgeman and Hoover (2008) have recently demonstrated, for
example, that farther portions of hills appear steeper than nearer portions—
arguing that this is partly because the visual information available to see the
slopes as departing from vertical becomes weaker with distance. We conducted
an experiment seeking to demonstrate that a fairly steep hill (of about 20
degrees) would appear steeper when viewed monocularly than when viewed
binocularly. We had observed the effect ourselves. The effect is well known for
small texture-defined surfaces viewed through an aperture (e.g., Gibson and
Cornsweet 1952), and we sought to document it for large locomotor surfaces.
When we closed an eye and looked straight ahead at the 20-degree hill it
appeared to us about 60–70 degrees. With both eyes open it looked about 40
degrees to us (slope overestimation is a typical and persistent finding).
The participants for our study met us near a campus field house. They were then
blindfolded and led to one of two grass-covered hills. There they stood between
two barriers that blocked any side view of the hill and were allowed to look
straight at the hill with either one or two eyes. A cluster of small white stones
placed on the hill at approximately eye level served as a fixation mark. Our
instructions were clear. We made them read a statement explaining that we
wanted them to tell us how things looked, not how they believed them to be. We
went over the instruction again orally—we emphasized the importance of them
reporting their perceptual experience. We even had them use a palm board first
—a board that is suspended on a horizontal axis and can be set to any
orientation—because using palm boards avoids some of the numeric bias effects
that go with verbal estimates. The (unseen) palm board estimate having been
recorded, each participant then made a verbal judgment of the apparent slope of
the hill. We then blindfolded them again, led them to the other of the two hills
and had them make the same pair of judgments (palm board match and verbal
estimate) in the other viewing condition (monocular if they were binocular at
first, or binocular if they had been monocular).
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We assumed that every participant would have about the same experience that
we had. We knew that they would be suspicious and that they might be reluctant
to get things wrong, but we still expected some small effect to be evident in their
judgments. As we collected more and more data, it was stunning to see that
there was no obvious effect. Contrary to our expectation, some people gave
slope estimates that were higher in the binocular condition than in the
monocular condition. In most cases, there was very little difference between the
two conditions in either the palm board data or in the verbal reports. We knew
we were in a deep and disturbing kind of methodological vortex, however, when
a student who had just given verbal estimates that differed by only 5 degrees in
the two conditions, turned to one of us as he was leaving at the conclusion of the
experiment and said (sincerely, it seemed): “It’s a really big effect isn’t it!” He
had seen it too, but his numeric estimates certainly made this hard to know.
In the end we tested twenty-six participants, dividing them roughly evenly
across which hill they saw first (one hill was 18.5 degrees, the other was 21.5
degrees) and whether they saw it binocularly or monocularly. Overall, if we look
at both judgments of both slopes (p.93) from each participant (i.e., attempt to
measure the effect within-subjects), our average palm board matches were 31.9
degrees (monocular) and 31.1 degrees (binocular), and our average verbal
judgments were 45.7 degrees and 42.8 degrees, which were not reliably
different from each other, t(26) ‹ 1.
By looking only at the first trial each participant engaged in, however, we might
hope to see the unprotected perceptual error as a between-subject effect.
Indeed, first-trial palm board estimates (mean = 33.3 degrees) in the monocular
viewing condition were higher than first-trial palm board estimates in the
binocular viewing condition (mean = 27.2 degrees), t(25) = 2.03, p = 0.027, onetailed. The verbal estimates in the two conditions (50.0 degrees monocular and
42.1 degrees binocular) were not reliably different from each other, t(25) = 1.40,
p = 0.087, one-tailed, though they trended in the predicted direction.
We believe that even these between-subject comparisons understate the
perceptual difference we observed. Thus even these judgments may reflect
cognitive corrections for viewing state. The comparison of between-subject and
within-subject differences suggests that in spite of our clear requests to these
participants that they tell us about their perceptions, the apparent withinsubjects constancy we measured across viewing states was due to strategic
compensatory judgments. Our method, which used very similar slopes for both
viewings, did nothing to prevent this. The idea that apparent constancy can
come from cognitive corrections is well supported (Granrud 2009).

Experiment 2: Judgmental bias masquerading as perception
On the other hand, sometimes we can find differences in judgments that may not
be perceptual. An exciting new form of ecological theory of surface perception
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has been introduced by Proffitt and colleages (Bhalla and Proffitt 1999; Proffitt
2006; Proffitt et al. 1995, 2003), suggesting that our perceptual experience has
embedded in it aspects of our behavioral potential including our current
physiological state. The new theory is exciting because it correctly notes that
perceptions do not have to be geometrically accurate to be useful for planning
actions. Moreover, it supposes, consistent with Milner and Goodale (1995), that
much of what is evident in conscious perception is there for longer-term
planning (in minutes or hours) whereas the online control of precise action
might be guided by unconscious visual information (in seconds or less). The
theory is supported by a variety of interesting results and paradigms that,
together, point to a conscious visual experience that is richly textured by the
intentions, attitudes, emotions, and energetics of the observer and the situation.
From an evolutionary perspective, the intrusion of these sorts of information into
one’s conscious visual awareness can be motivated because (a) it is only
conscious experience (rather than motor control) that is affected, and (b) these
kinds of considerations might well be desired to be integrated into our
perceptual experience for the purposes of efficient (effortless) planning and
decision making.
A drawback of the theory is that it suggests that violations of constancy are not
only ubiquitous, but also variable, depending on many factors. This could make
perceptual prediction processes difficult. Moreover, the theory seems to blur the
distinction between (p.94) perception and judgment. For example, in an
extension to cognitive dissonance, participants required to wear a ridiculous
costume while walking in a public space judged the distance of the space to be
larger if they were paid well for their efforts than if they were not (Balcetis and
Dunning 2007). Classically, such biasing of judgments in the cognitive
dissonance literature is not always regarded as perceptual, but the new theory
encourages judgments of this sort to be classified as perceptions. Although the
boundary is not always clear, we suggest that a distinction between perceptual
effects and effects on judgment may be reasonably sustained in many relevant
cases.
Indeed, we will present evidence that experimental demand characteristics can
influence perceptual judgments without necessarily reaching down into
perceptual experience. This is not to argue that there are no cases where
perceptions may be affected by intentions, emotions, or other extra-visual
factors (e.g., Durgin and Gigone 2007; Durgin et al. 2005). It is likely, for
example, that attentional factors can alter perceptual experience dramatically
(Carrasco et al. 2004), and clearly physiological effects of age and fatigue, for
example, may influence the quality of visual processing rather directly. Rather
than doubting the possibility of perceptual effects, our immediate concern is
with whether transient manipulations of such things as physical load (or
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embarrassment, or what-have-you) actually affect the perception of distance and
geographical slope rather than merely judgments concerning these perceptions.
One of the most interesting (and ultimately controversial) effects reported by
Proffitt et al. (2003) was that distances appeared greater when wearing a heavy
backpack. A number of labs immediately began playing with this effect,
including ours, and found it difficult to replicate (Hutchison and Loomis 2006;
Woods et al. 2009). In the published controversies about this effect, several
further claims became established which appear to contradict either the
evolutionary account above or to contradict the equation of judgment and
perception. Specifically, although within-subject designs are decidedly more
sensitive in the face of inter-subject variability, Proffitt et al. (2006) have argued
that Hutchison and Loomis (2006) failed to detect the backpack effect with a
within-subject design because the scaling applied to the participants’
perceptions in one condition would have carried over to the other. However, if
participants can so easily undermine the alleged effect of the backpack, this
would seem to undermine, in turn, the evolutionary value of the purported
immediacy of these effects.
The claim that within-subject designs may introduce metacognitive
contamination is not without merit on its own terms, as we have argued in the
previous section, but it can only be supported insofar as a distinction is
maintained between judgment and perception that is not maintained in the case
of the cognitive dissonance results discussed above, for example. (Otherwise, we
must conclude that backpacks really did not affect distance perception in the
Hutchison and Loomis study, because they did not affect judgments.) This point
aside, Proffitt et al. (2006) have correctly argued that whereas Hutchison and
Loomis had failed to replicate the effect even with a between-subject design, the
number of participants used in the experiment was less than that used by
Proffitt et al. (2003), and the data appear to trend in the predicted direction. In
other words, the failure to replicate in the between-subject version was
inconclusive.
(p.95) We set out to do the opposite of what Hutchison and Loomis had done.
That is, rather than failing to replicate an experiment demonstrating a backpack
effect on distance, we sought to experimentally produce a backpack effect. Our
goal, however, was to test whether the effect of the backpack might be due to a
judgmental bias in response to implicit demands of the experimental situation.
Demand characteristics of an experiment are the cues that participants receive
as to what the experimental hypothesis might be (Orne 1959). The relationship
between experimenter and participant is typically one in which participants
perceive it to be their duty to help the experimenter by being cooperative. When
participants receive cues as to how they are supposed to behave in an
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experiment, they often will behave in a manner consistent with this demand
character (Orne 1962).
To test whether backpacks impose an experimental demand in a backpack
experiment we first administered a brief survey: Thirty-one Swarthmore College
undergraduates enrolled in Introductory Psychology were given the survey after
completing an unrelated experiment. In the survey, an experiment similar to that
of Proffitt et al. (2003) was described in which an experimenter has participants
wear a heavy backpack and make distance judgments (only the backpack
condition was described). The question in the survey simply asked respondents
to report what they thought the experimenter’s hypothesis was in the
experiment just described; no alternatives were presented. Twenty (65%)
respondents indicated that the experimenter hypothesized that the backpack
would affect distance judgments, and of those respondents, sixteen (80%)
described a hypothesis that involved distance judgments increasing as a result of
wearing the backpack (the second most common hypothesis was simply that the
backpack would in some way degrade performance). Thus, to the majority of our
respondents, the experimental hypothesis actually entertained by Proffitt et al.
(2003) was transparent, and it seems likely that for many of the participants in
the original study, the hypothesis was similarly transparent.
The experiment we report here involved judgments of slope rather than
distance, but the concerns are the same. Although effects of backpacks on
perceptual judgments of slope have been reported (Bhalla and Proffitt 1999) and
widely cited, we were surprised to learn that they had never been demonstrated
in a controlled experiment. Instead, Bhalla and Proffitt measured slope
perception in Introductory Psychology students who were all required to wear
backpacks while making slope judgments. Bhalla and Proffitt then compared
these judgments with previously published data they had collected with a
different set of participants (passersby) in a different social context. Because
their manipulation was not applied to equivalent groups, it was not a true
experiment. Thus, the experiment we will describe here may be the first direct
experimental test of the effect of backpacks on slope perception. We have
subsequently replicated the result with a more sophisticated design by utilizing
a post-experiment questionnaire (Durgin et al. 2009).
Crucially, we used three between-subject conditions in our experiment, rather
than two, because it was essential to our design that we manipulate the
presence or absence of an experimental demand as well as the presence or
absence of a heavy backpack. Our participants were randomly assigned to
conditions. In the Baseline condition, participants made slope judgments without
any backpack. In the Standard Backpack condition, (p.96) participants made
slope judgments while wearing a heavy backpack. In the Control for Demand
condition, participants wore the same heavy backpack while making slope
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judgments, but were first given a plausible explanation for the backpack that
was intended to remove the experimental demand.
To create a plausible explanation for the requirement to wear a heavy backpack,
the experiment was done in an immersive virtual reality and the backpack was
described as containing equipment crucial for the head-mounted display (HMD)
that the participants all wore. Indeed, in the Control condition, the video
processor for the HMD was carried in the backpack (along with several heavy
weights), and the cables between the processor and the HMD were made to
appear short so that wearing the backpack seemed necessary for wearing the
HMD. To further provide participants with an alternative hypothesis about the
purpose of the experiment, we showed them simulated slopes composed of two
different types of texture.
Whereas Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) asked participants their weight and set the
backpack weight to be 1/6–1/5 of this, we did not want to call attention to weight
in the low-demand condition, so we used a standard backpack weight of 25 lb
(11.3 kg) for all participants. In the previous semester, while conducting a pilot
experiment, we had determined that this weight was at least 1/6 of the weight of
94% of the female participants in our participant pool. Our recruitment strategy
involved inviting randomly selected females from the Introductory Psychology
pool to participate for credit. The women recruited did not know that they were
selected for gender. Thirty female undergraduates students were divided evenly
among the three conditions (two additional participants were excluded for
failing to follow instructions).
Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) used only two slopes and collected three types of
measure for each (verbal estimates, visual estimates using an adjustable twodimensional angle representation, and an unseen hand-manipulated palm
board). They reported that the backpack affected verbal estimates for the lower
(5-degree) hill, and visual estimates for both (5 degrees and 31 degrees), but did
not affect palm board estimates for either. Proffitt et al. (1995) have shown that
visual and verbal measures tend to measure the same things. We used a verbal
measure as well as a haptic matching task (palm board).
There were three between-subject conditions. In the Baseline condition, no
backpack was worn. In the Control for Demand condition, subjects wore a heavy
backpack that was described as containing the video apparatus for the HMD (it
did contain the 3.1 kg apparatus, along with an additional 8.2 kg of weights);
long cables ran into it from a computer and other short cables ran from it to the
HMD. In the Standard condition, the backpack contained only weights (11.3 kg),
and no explanation was given for why it had to be worn; the video processor was
placed on a nearby surface, and several dumbbell-style weights were visible on
another nearby surface to emphasize that weights were being used.
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The apparent experimental manipulation (to help with the deception) was that
different textures were used to cover the slopes in the virtual environment. Four
slopes were tested in the main experiment, from shallow (7 degrees) to steep (28
degrees) by steps of 7 degrees, and each slope was shown using two different
textures, one of which was the (p.97) primary texture, having well-defined
texels, and the other a more abstract “grassy” texture. Prior to these
measurements, there were five practice trials used to camouflage the limited
number of actual angles tested and to allow students to get used to the different
textures. The first slope presented was always in the primary texture type and at
the center of the range of slopes to be presented (i.e., 17.5 degrees). There
followed four additional practice trials that varied in texture and presented
slopes that were both higher than 28 degrees and lower than 7 degrees so as to
render the experimental range a subset of the range seen. After five practice
trials and eight randomly ordered experimental trials, the four slopes were again
presented in the primary texture (in random order) for the haptic response.
Thus, participants completed a total of seventeen trials (thirteen verbal and four
haptic).
The stimuli were presented stereoscopically in an nVis HMD with a nominal 60degree diagonal field of view (approximately 39 degrees vertical and 49 degrees
horizontal). A HiBall optical head-tracker provided sub-mm precision at 120 Hz.
The scene was viewed from eye-height in stereo (using the participant’s
measured pupillary separation) rendered and displayed at 60 Hz with 1280 ×
1024-pixel resolution using custom OpenGL software. The display was
immersive and compensated for all head-movements, corrected to eye position.
The total lag was less than 50 milliseconds. The orientation of a rigid plastic
palm board, mounted on a tripod at about chest level, was monitored by a
second HiBall tracker. The palm board was placed higher than in Proffitt et al.
(1995) because in this raised position it was easier to manipulate (He et al.
2007); the HMD ensured the palm board could not be seen.
Each virtual hill presented in the experiment was defined as a planar surface
that extended above the line of sight of the observer and extended to the left and
right farther than the observer could see. The hill surface smoothly curved over
a meter of surface into the simulated ground surface on which the participants
stood. To prevent inspection of the cross-section of the hill, observers viewed the
hill through a virtual doorway that obstructed their view of the hill beyond
approximately 54 degrees of azimuth to the left and right. The participant stood
4.5 ± 0.5 m from the base of the hill, behind and between two virtual walls. The
walls were 8 m high, 0.25 m deep, and were positioned 2 m in front and 2 m to
the side of where participants stood. The height of the hill was always higher
than eye-height and was varied so that the angle of gaze to the top of the hill did
not vary consistently with hill slope.
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Because the field of view inside the HMD was limited, participants were
instructed during the first practice trial to look to the left and right before
making their judgments to get a better sense of the spatial layout. They were
also encouraged to look at the ground to their left and right to help stabilize
their sense of what a horizontal surface looked like. Normally this information
would be present in peripheral vision.
Finally, the participant was asked to provide a verbal estimate of the slope of the
hill in degrees. This number was entered by the experimenter, and the virtual
world went blank for about a second before the next hill was presented. After
the thirteen verbal trials were completed, the experimenter explained the use of
the (unseen) palm board and had the (p.98) participant reach out to it. The
participants, who were encouraged to explore the hill visually as before, then
adjusted the palm board and indicated when they felt that it was parallel with
the slope of the hill. The final position was recorded. After four palm-board trials
(all with the primary texture on the surface), the HMD was removed and the
experimenter fully debriefed the participants. The entire procedure took about
20 minutes.
A graph of the mean verbal estimates and palm board estimates for each of the
three conditions is shown in Figure 4.1. The verbal means for the Baseline,
Control, and Standard conditions were, respectively, 29.3 ± 15 degrees, 28.5 ±
5.2 degrees, and 36.7 ± 8.7 degrees. Consistent with the demand hypothesis,
verbal estimates in the Standard condition were reliably greater than those in
the Control condition, t(18) = 2.578, p = 0.019. That is, when the backpack was
worn as part of the experiment (without explanation), slopes were judged
reliably steeper than when the same weighted backpack was worn (and
described) as an incidental part of the apparatus. Consistent with the report of
Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) there was no effect of condition on the palm board
settings (but see Durgin et al. 2010).
So do heavy backpacks affect the perception of slope, or only the estimates of
the participants? Having conducted a true experiment on the effects of wearing
a backpack on
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(p.99) slope judgments, we find
that the experimental demand
posed by the backpack in the
Standard condition is sufficient to
produce an effect on verbal
judgments (though not on haptic
slope matches). The effect is of the
magnitude reported by Bhalla and
Proffitt (1999). We can conclude
that the effect on verbal
judgments is due to experimental
demand (and thus most likely an
effect on judgment, not
perception) rather than the weight
of the backpack, because we have
a control condition in which the
same backpack is worn, but a
plausible explanation is provided
for wearing it.

Based on our data, it seems
reasonable to conclude that
effects of backpacks on
perceptual judgments are due
to cognitive biases induced by
the social context of the

Fig. 4.1 Mean slope estimates in
Experiment 2, in which virtual slopes
were judged by three groups of
participants who either wore no backpack
(Baseline), wore a heavy backpack that
was explained as part of the video
processing apparatus for the head
mounted display (Control for Demand) or
wore a heavy backpack simply at the
request of the experimenter while making
the judgments (Standard Backpack).

experiment rather than effortbased changes in perception. Notice that because we have replicated the result
reported by Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) and shown that it depends on demand
characteristics, the details of our implementation of the experiment are not
really at issue. Unlike studies that have failed to replicate backpack effects on
distance (Hutchison and Loomis 2006; Woods et al. 2009), our goal has not been
to argue that there are no effects of backpacks, but to show that the effects that
have been reported so far are probably due to social influences on judgment
rather than physiological influences on perceptual experience. In subsequent
investigations, we have found that a “compliant” subset of participants drive the
effect: they give high slope estimates, are able to articulate the hypothesis
afterward, and also state that they believe they were affected (Durgin et al.
2009). If they had been affected perceptually, they should have no way of
knowing they had been affected.
If perceptual experiences reflect perceptual prediction, as has been argued for
self-motion perception (Durgin 2009), then perceptual experience had better not
be arbitrarily plastic. Effort theorists have tended to sidestep this concern by
appealing to Milner and Goodale’s (1995) separation of vision for action and
vision for perception (e.g., Proffitt 2006). They describe palm boards as action
measures. But the claim that, for example, palm board measures are “action
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measures” (Bhalla and Proffitt 1999) has little to recommend it; adjusting the
consciously-perceived haptic orientation of a palm board by hand has no evident
relationship to the motor action of stepping onto a hill (see Durgin et al. 2010).
We suggest that palm board measures are simply less affected by judgmental
biases (though they may still suffer from them)—as was also evident in
Experiment 1. Our data support the conservative view that perceptual
experience is probably not as subject to fluctuation as the effort theorists have
argued. That is, whereas perceptual judgments (especially from memory) are
subject to vagaries of social expectation and cognitive dissonance, there seems
to be little evidence that perceptual experience is affected by transitory burdens.

Conclusion: Downhill from here
When is perceptual constancy important? Li and Durgin (2009) have recently
observed a striking apparent failure of constancy in the perception of downhill
slopes: For hills or even small ramps viewed from the top, perceived slope is
much steeper if one stands back from the edge of the hill so that one’s incident
gaze is nearly parallel with the sloped surface. This means that if one
approaches a steep (e.g., 20-degree) downhill slope from the (p.100) level
ground above it, the hill surface initially appears particularly steep, but then
grows visibly shallower as one nears the edge. The same effect can be observed
when approaching a flight of stairs. What was most striking to us in this
discovery, however, was that we had to look for it, and that no one else seems to
have reported it before.
Whereas others have argued that downhill slopes are judged steeper than uphill
slopes (Proffitt et al. 1995), we would now argue that there is no unique value
for perceived slope from the top of a hill. It depends on where you stand. We
discovered this because we wondered whether aiming one’s gaze down along a
hill would help one to see the true orientation of the hill. This led us to explore
viewing positions that were different distances from the edge and to notice that
the apparent slope of the hill seemed even steeper (and therefore less accurate)
as we stood a few steps back. We have found that this can be quantitatively
modeled by a combination of proprioceptive error regarding gaze direction and
logarithmic coding of optical slant (surface slant relative to gaze orientation). We
have also found that the proprioceptive perception of head pitch (even with
closed eyes) is greatly exaggerated (Li and Durgin 2009).
How can such a failure of orientation constancy go unnoticed in daily life? Our
argument here is that the experience of virtual perceptual constancy sometimes
depends on the predictability of the perceptual consequences of our actions.
Much as we seldom notice the optic flow of the environment as we move—it is
expected—even large fluctuations in apparent surface orientation may be
unremarkable to us. Future work can seek to determine whether, in this
particular case, this is because these apparent deformations are predictable
perceptual consequences of our actions (Durgin et al. 2007b), as seems to be the
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case for the optic flow of the ground plane (Durgin et al. 2005; Durgin 2009), or
because our own self-motion often masks apparent object rotations anyway
(Wallach et al. 1974).
Throughout this paper we have sought to support the notion that there are
perceptual facts that are distinct from judgments we make about them and we
have pointed to correspondences as well as discrepancies between introspective
experience and measurable performance. As an example of a correspondence,
we reviewed evidence that motion parallax does not seem to support the
perception of empty space in the same way that binocular strereopsis does at
intermediate distances. In Experiment 1, we suggested that real perceptual
differences in surface slope were being masked by metacognitive strategies that
produced null effects in within-subject comparisons. Between-subject
comparisons revealed the predicted (and probably real) perceptual differences
in slope perception for monocular viewing compared to binocular viewing,
though likely underestimated them. These differences corresponded
qualitatively with our own subjective impressions. With Experiment 2, however,
we argued that judgmental biases rather than perceptual differences were
responsible for the effects of backpacks on judgments of slope. When a heavy
backpack was worn in a context that licensed the implication that the backpack
was intended to affect slope judgments, slope estimates were higher than when
the same heavy backpack was worn in a context that removed this demand
character of the experimental context.
(p.101) Whereas traditional constancy research has often confounded
metacognitive judgments and perceptual experience, Granrud’s (2009) work
suggests that underconstancy is more the rule than the exception when
metacognition is directly assessed. Here we have advanced the notion that
stable underconstancy may be functional in supporting the guidance and control
of action because it preserves the structured correlations (such as between selfmotion and perceived optic flow) that can be used to tune perception most
precisely for the control of action (Durgin 2009; Durgin et al. 2010).
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